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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN MEIER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MERRILL SOREN 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9855 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMEN'T OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injury arising 
out of an intersection collision between the plain-
tiff and the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COUIR'T 
The defendant seeks to have the judgment of 
the trial court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The principal facts out of which this action 
arose have been recited in the Brief of the Appellant. 
Further reference to the record will be made in 
connection with respondent's argument. 
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STATEMEN'T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEG-
E'D PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE COURT CON-
CERNING CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE, 
AND COUNSEL'S INVITATION TO THE COUR'T TO 
EXAMINE ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, PRE-
CLUDES ASSIGNING SUOH CONDUCT AS ERROR 
ON APPEAL, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE REVERSI'BLE ERROR. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S AL-
LEGED CONTRIBUTORY NEGUGE:NCE AND PROX-
IMATE CAUSE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ALLEG-
EU PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS OF THE COURT CON-
CERNING CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE, 
AND COUNSEL'S INVITATION TO THE COURT TO 
EXAMINE ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, PRE-
CLUDES ASSIGNING SUCH CONDUCT AS ERROR 
ON APPEAL, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
'The plaintiff cites extensively from the record, 
certain testimony of Leslie Jensen, the former Chief 
of Police of Richfield. Claim is now made that 
questions asked of the witness by the judge, and 
comments made during the course thereof, consti-
tuted prejudicial error. During the course of the 
testimony, the officer attempted to illustrate his 
theory in arriving at the point of impact of the two 
2 
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automobiles. Portions of this testimony was objected 
to by counsel for defendant. (R. 137). Thereafter 
discussion ensued between Court and counsel 1as to 
the basis of the testimony. Counsel for the plaintiff 
then invited the court 'to interrogate the witness in 
this language : 
"MR. OLSEN: I would be glad to have 
you ask that question of the officer if you 
would like to . . . I think it might be well for 
the jury to understand that." (R. 1'38). 
Following this overture the court undertook to ques-
tion the witness as cited on pages 6 through 12 of 
Appellant's Brief. After the witness had made fur-
ther explanation concerning his procedure in iden-
tifying the point of impact, Mr. Olsen then asked: 
"Now did 'that answer your Honor's ques-
tion as to the 'checks the officers had?" (R. 
1'39). 
A further discussion followed between the Oourt, 
the witness and counsel, following which counsel 
for the plain tiff again queried: 
"MR. OLSEN: Do you have any further 
questions, Your Honor?" (R. 140). 
The appellant cl'aims the trial court's conduct 
was prejudicial because attention was focused on 
the importance of the problem. However, no objec-
tion was made ; rather, several relevant questions 
were invited by plaintiff's counsel who expressed 
his desire to have the jury hear the testimony so 
developed. ( R. 138, 140). 
The plaintiff points to a colloquy between Court 
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and counsel which he claims was designed to "under-
mine" the testimony of the officer. Appellant's Brief 
p. 9). These remarks followed a discussion between 
counsel concerning the admission into evidence of 
a proposed exhibit by the plaintiff. Certain com-
ments of plaintiff's counsel were objected to as be-
ing argumentive. In ruling upon the offer the Court 
stated: 
"THE COUR'T: Let me say that I think 
that it is probably confusing. Mter all the 
only way to determine, it seems to me, the 
point of impact, is take that area, for example 
which is legally described as the intersection, 
from the sidewalk on the north bordered by 
the sidewalk on tile west, by the sidewalk on 
the south, by the sidewalk on the east. Now 
that area comprises your intersection. 
"MR. OLSEN: 'That's correct, Your Hon-
or." (R. 152). 
'The plaintiff cannot properly assign as error a 
statement by the Court with which agreement was 
expressed. Additionally, the court's remark, was 
m·ade during ·tfue course of ruling on a matter before 
him. In any event, no objection to any question, re-
mark or comment of the court, was ever registered 
'by plain tiff. 
It is not improper for the trial judge to express 
to the jury his reasons for admitting or excluding 
particular evidence, if while so doing he does not 
indicate an erroneous view of the law which may 
mislead the jury. 88 C.J.S. Trials, Sec. 50. 
4 
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In Fox vs. Taylor, 10 U.2d 174, 3'50 P.2d 154, 
this Court stated. 
"We recognize the duty of the court under 
our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or 
which may tend to indicate an opinion as to 
what the facts are on disputed issues. Yet 
it must be realized that it is quite impossible 
to frame instructions applicable 'to a given 
case without making some reference to facts 
and sometimes to evidence." 
It was there observed that a statement by the 
Court that a "mere glance in the direction of the 
approaching automdbile" is not sufficient to con-
stitute due care. Further, the court pointed out 'that 
elsewhere in 'the instructions the jury was told of 
its sole prerogative to determine the facts on the 
basis of the evidence. 
In Douglas vs. Duvall, 5 U."2d 42'9, 4'31, 304 
P;2d 3'73, conduct of the trial court was claimed 
as prejudicial error when a discourse was given 
outlining 'the duties of directors which was phrased 
"somewhat in the vernacular." The charge was found 
to be without merit. See also Federated Milk Pro-
ducers Assn. vs. Statewide Plumbing, 11 U.2d 2'95, 
358 P.2d 348. If any evidence is stated by the trial 
judge, the jury must be advised tha:t they are the 
exclusive judges of iall questions of fact. Such was 
done in the present case. (See Instructions No. 2, 
3, 4 and 6, R. 12, 13, 14 and 16). 
In the case of State vs. Zimmerman, 78 U. 126, 
1 P.2d 962, on motion for a new trial, the defendant 
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assigned as error a statement by the trial court to 
the jury after it appeared that the jury was having 
difficulty in reaching a verdict, to the effect that 
the evidence was clear and simple. The jury retired 
and then returned shortly with a guilty verdict. The 
following language is taken from the opinion: 
"No claim is made by .appellant that any 
objection or exception was taken to the state-
ment m'ade by the trial court to the jury at 
the time such statement was made or at all 
until the filing of the motion for a new trial. 
Appellant contends that the statement com-
plained of was in the nature of an instruction 
to the jury and should have been in writing. 
It is well established in this jurisdiction that 
an exception to an instruction must be made 
before verdict, otherwise it may not be re-
viewed on appeal. The statement complained 
of, however, cannot well be said to be an in-
struction, but whether it be regarded as an 
instruction or as a remark, the rule is the 
same. An objectionable remark directed to the 
jury must be excepted to or it may not be re-
viewed on appeal. 17 C.J. 79. A remark of a 
judge to a jury may not be said to be an order, 
decision, or ruling and therefore it is not 
deemed excepted to under the provisions of 
section 6806, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917. 
We are th ns precluded from reviewing the in-
struction or remark which appellant seeks to 
have revietced, becattSe, so jar as appears, no 
exception 1cas taken thereto until after ver-
dict." (Emphasis added). 
See also Tulsa Hospital Assn. vs. Juby, 73 Okla. 
243, 175 P. 519. 
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The basis of this rule is sound. For as stated 
in Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company 
vs. Alan Oil Company, 123 U. 253, 258 P.2d 445, 
450, one of the purposes in requiring counsel to make 
objections to instructions in the trial court is to 
bring to the attention of the court all claimed errors 
in the instructions, and to give him an opportunity 
to correct them if he deems proper. Just as a motion 
to strike evidence, which turns out to be unfavor-
able to the party against whom it is offered, is not 
a substitute for an objection, neither should a party 
be permitted to object to invited questions of the 
court when answers to them may not be as favor-
able as counsel had hoped. He has thus taken his 
chances of advantage and should not have, when he 
finds the testimony prejudicial, or at least not help-
ful, the legal right to exclude it or avoid the conse-
quence by later objecting.Peterson v. Hansen-Nied-
erhauser, 13 U.2d 3'55, 37 4 P.2d 5'13. 
It is submitted that the questions put to plain-
tiff's witness by the court were invited by counsel, 
that any reference to evidence by the court was 
made within the proper discretion and province of 
the court. Further, no objection was made to any 
of such questions or comments and the plaintiff 
cannot properly be heard to complain of these mat-
ters on appeal. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S AL-
LEGED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND PROX-
IMATE CAUSE. 
Appellan1t's contention that she entered the in-
tersection in which the collision occurred first, as-
sumes a factual conclusion which was a disputed 
issue properly submitted to the jury, and determined 
against her. There was evidence, based upon the point 
df 'impact as fixed by the plaintiff's own witness, 
from which the jury could properly conclude that 
she was not first in the intersection and did not have 
the right of way, since the defendant had traveled 
nearly through the intersection before the collision 
occurred in plaintiff's east lane of north-bound traf-
fic. (Ptaintiff was proceeding north 'and Defendant 
was proceeding east. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, R. 102). 
Further there was testimony that plaintiff's windows 
were covered with frost. (R. 176, 349). This, with-
out more, is a sufficient basis for finding that the 
plain tiff failed to keep a proper lookout or to exercise 
due 'Care upon entering the intersection !and that she 
was contributorily negligent in failing to yield the 
right of way. The Court's Instruction Number 7 
properly left to the jury the question of which driver 
had the favored position in the intersection, and 
accurately stated the law in respect thereto. 
INSTRUC'Tl'ON NO. 7 
"When two vehicles are approaching an 
interesction at the same time and at substan-
8 
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tially the same distance therefrom, the driver 
approaching o nthe right has the right-of-way, 
and it is the duty of the driver approaching 
on the left to yield the right-of-way to the 
former. This is the basic rule of right-of-way 
at intersections and failure to abide by it con-
stitutes negligence. 
'~There is a secondary rule of right-of-
way at intersections, which is that the driver 
first entering the intersection has the right-
of-way and it is the duty of the driver later 
entering the intersection to yield to the form-
er. However, this latter rule must not be so 
applied that the drivers are permitted to speed 
up or continue headlong into the intersection 
merely because they enter a foot, or a yard, 
or an instant of time ahead of the other. In 
order for a driver approaching from the left 
to ·take advantage of this rule he must not 
have speeded up for the express purpose of 
getting into the intersection first, and it must 
appear that he had a clear and substantial 
priority in time in entering the intersection 
ahead of the driver approaching from the 
right before the driver approaching from the 
left m·ay claim the right-of-way." (R. 17). 
'This instruction clearly and properly states the 
law with respect to right of way at intersections 
as provided in Section 41-6-72, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. The court also gave the following re-
lated instructions: 
INSTRUC'TION No. 9A 
'·'You are instructed that the evidence 
of reasonable care requires a driver to see 
and observe what is there to be seen and fail-
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ure to see approaching vehicles within the 
range of reasonable observation is negli- ·J 
gence." 
INSTRUCTTON NO. 10 
"When the law says that one person has 
the right-of-way over another, it simply means 
that one person has the immediate privilege 
of occupying the space in question and the 
other persons must yield to such person." 
INSTUC'TION NO. 11 
"'The fact that one has the right-of-way, 
if such be the fact, does not excuse him from 
the exercise of ordinary care to avoid causing 
an accident. 
The instructions taken together clearly define 
the rule of la·w which should have been applied in 
this case. The ptain tiff complains that the failure of 
the court to give h'is Instruction No. 4. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 15, R. 47), was error because the jury 
was not advised that if she were at the time of, and 
immediately prior to the accident, driving her auto-
mobile into and across the intersection in a lawful 
and proper manner, that "she had the right to as-
sume and rely an'd 'act on the assumption that others 
would do likewise; since she was not dbliged to anti-
cipate either ·that other drivers would drive negli-
gently nor fail to accord her right-of-way until in 
the exercise of due care she observed, or should have 
observed, something to warn her that the other driver 
was driving negligently or would fail to accord her 
the right-of-way." 
10 
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The court properly refused to give this instruc-
tion be~ause the circumstances of this case precluded 
the applicabili!ty of the instruction to the facts as 
established largely through her own testimony. ( R. 
202) . She did not know her speed before entering 
the intersection. She said that she looked to her 
left as she approached the intersection. (R. 20'2). 
She did not see the defendant's truck although it 
was approaching from the left traveling 15-~20 mph~ 
(R. 348). Plaintiff suggests that her view of the 
intersection was obstructed by a house, a parked 
truck, and a high fence covered with vines and trees. 
(R. '20'5). This would indicate that if rshe did look to 
her lefrt, it was some distance from the intersection. 
Near the intersection her view of First South Street, 
on which defendant was traveling, was unobstruct-
ed. At her deposition she testified she didn't know 
for sure if she had looked in both directions before 
entering the intersection. ( R. 241). She first saw 
the defendant's truck almost simultaneously with 
the happening of the collision. (R. 24!5, 20'2, 203). 
The only time that she looked to the left, if at all, 
her vision w:as obscured, either from physical ob-
structions or from a frosted or steamed windshield. 
She did not make an a;ttempt to observe approach-
ing traffi,c to her left immediately before entering 
the intersection. Thus, the court''s Instruction No. 
9A was proper. 
Even a ''glance" in the direction of approrach-
ing traffic does not satisfy the requirement of due 
'11 
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care. Fox vs. Taylor, 10 U.2d 17 4, 350 P.2d 154. 
She is charged to see what reasonably could be ob-
served. 
Instruction No. 7, as given, is based upon Mar-
tin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 747, and 
was properly adapted to the facts of this case, as 
indica;ted by the more recent cases. 
In Johnson vs. Syme, 6 U.2d 319, 313 P.2d 4168, 
the favored driver was held negligent as a matter 
of law in failing to see a disfavored driver crossing 
at an intersection until 20 to 30 feet away. The 
Court concluded: 
" ... that plaintiff either looked and 
failed to see the obvious, or failed to look at 
all, and, as a mater of law negligently con-
tributed to her own injuries. . . ." 
'The following language is taken from Morris 
vs. Christensen, 11 U.2d 140, 356 P.2d 34, concern-
ing the duties of drivers at intersections: 
"It is the duty of a driver to observe and 
see what there is to see so :as to be able to ex-
ercise ordinary precaution and prevent colli-
sions such as this. This duty extends to the 
favored driver with the right of way as well 
as the disfavored driver. But he who has the 
right of way need not anticipate sudden out-
burs~ts of negligence on the part of another 
driver. Indeed it may be said that failure to 
observe is negligence proximately contribut-
ing to the harm only where by observing the 
driver could have avoided or lessened the re-
sulting harm." 
'The circumstances presented in the present case 
12 
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indicate no "sudden outbursts of negligence", if any, 
on the part of Christensen. He proceeded into the 
intersection at aproximately 15-20 mph. Neither 
dbserved the other until just before impact. Had 
plaintiff seen defendant :at a time when reasonable 
observation would have revealed his presence, the 
collision could have been, by reasonable action, avoid-
ed or the harm lessened. 
In Hess vs. Robinson, 109 U. 60, 163 P.2d 510, 
the plaintiff was driving southward along a through 
street and railed to see defendant's ambulance com-
ing into the intersection from the west. A collision 
occurred in the intersection. It was held that even 
though pl1aintfff was negligent in not seeing the 
ambulance, the question :as to whether his negligence 
proximately contributed to his injury was properly 
submitted to the jury. Similar facts exist in this 
case. Plaintiff's contributory negligence in not look-
ing to her left, or observing what she should have 
observed, was properly submitted to the jury. The 
facts were resolved against her and in reviewing 
the matter on appeal the facts are to be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party 
below. Ortega vs. Thomas, ____ U.2d ____ , 383 P.2d 406. 
In Lowder vs. Holley, 120 U. 2'31, '2'3'3 P.2d 350, 
cited by appeHant, the court found that the plain-
tiff's failure to see the defendant's approaching 
truck could in no way have contributed to the acci-
dent because there was evidence which indicated 
that even had he looked the defendant's truck would 
1_3 
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have been 2'50 feet 1away, and he could have assumed 
and acted on the assumption that the driver of. tne 
truck would exercise ordinary and reasonable care 
in his driving and tha;t it would be safe to cross the 
intersection. There is no such evidence in this case. 
Observation would have revealed Defendant's truck 
either within the intersection, or approaching so 
closely as to make it unsafe to enter. 
In the present case the plaintiff was negligent 
in at least one of the f'ollowing particulars: 
( 1) In failing to look before entering 
the intersection, or 
( 2) In f!a:iling to observe wha;t reason-
aJble observation would have revealed; or 
(3) In entering the intersection when 
it was not safe to do so. 
Thus, the plaintiff's requested instruction No. 
4 to the effect that she was entitled to proceed into 
the intersection until in the exercise of due care, 
she observed, or should have observed, something 
to warn her that the other driver was driving negli-
gently or would ~ail to accord her right-of-way, had 
no basis under the facts and testimony of this case. 
The plaintiff also complains that a specific 
instruction concerning proximate cause was not 
given for the pllaintiff's benefit. Proximate cause 
was correctly defined in Instruction No. 12. The 
effect of negligence on the part of either party was 
stated in Instruction No. 15A. It also dealt with 
14 
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and properly defined proximate cause. 'The plaintiff 
assigns as error the failure of the Court to give his 
Instruction No. 5 which deals with proximlate cause 
and contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Both 
were adequately dealt with in Instruction 15A. 
Although appellant complains of the Court's In-
struction No. 18, no obje'ction was made concerning 
it. (R. 355-357). 
The instructions are to be considered as a whole 
since the Court dbviously cannot give all of the law 
pertaining to the case in one instruction. When this 
is done, it is apparent that the law of the case was 
adequately covered in the instructions given and 
no prejudicial error was committed. 
CONCLUSTON 
'The trial court did not commit prejudici1al error 
in questioning the police officer who was 'Called as 
plaintiff's witness. Such questioning was invited 
by plaintiff's counsel and statements of evidence 
made by the ~court were either agreed to, or were 
made within permissible limits. No objections were 
made to any of such proceedings \and cannot be pro-
perly raised for the first time on appeal. The court, 
under the facts of this ~ase, properly instructed the 
jury on the issues of contributory negligence and 
proximate cause. 
15 
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
rendered on the jury verdi~t should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN and 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
By--------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIN·G 
I certify that three ('3) copies of the foregoing 
Brief were served upon Olsen & Chamberlain, at-
torneys for Appellant, 76 South Main Street, Rich-
field, Utah, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
to said attorneys at the address stated this ------------
day of September, 1963. 
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